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RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS 
 Supplier development investments do not automatically result in relationship 
benefits and can be even detrimental.  
 Relational capital enables supplier development to create benefits for the supplier 
and reciprocated benefits for the buyer. 
 Capability development and supplier governance work independently to increase 
relational capital resulting in mutual benefits. 
 Relational capital can overcome any resentment associated with supplier 
governance compliance thus encouraging shared benefits. 
 Paradoxically relational capital hinders reciprocated benefits from capability 
development. 
  
ABSTRACT  
 
Buyers invest considerably in developing their suppliers, yet the performance effects of 
such investments are not universal. Drawing on social capital theory, this research 
investigates whether the relationship between supplier development and relationship 
benefits may be facilitated by the generation of relational capital. The authors examine 
mediating and moderating roles of relational capital in the relationship between two 
aspects of supplier development (capability development, supplier governance) and two 
dimensions of relationship benefits (supplier benefits, buyer benefits), using survey data 
collected from 185 suppliers of a large manufacturing firm. Investment in supplier 
development does not automatically result in benefits for the supplier or reciprocated 
benefits for the buyer. Rather, relational capital “bridges” supplier development and 
relationship benefits: Without relational capital, benefits from capability development do 
not accrue, and the impact of a supplier governance regime can be even detrimental. In 
conditions of high relational capital, capability development results in lower perceived 
buyer benefits. The results can help managers ensure that the benefits from their supplier 
development efforts fully materialize. 
Keywords: relational capital, supplier development, buyer–supplier relationship 
1. Introduction  
“To score big with suppliers, you have to win their hearts.” 
—Dave Nelson, former vice president of purchasing, Honda of America1 
Competition is daunting, and firms operate with increasingly volatile supply chains, in 
which both buyers and suppliers recognize the benefits of collaborative partnerships 
(Hales, et al. 2011). With the shifting focus from transactional to collaborative 
relationships, buyers have grown increasingly aware of the strategic importance of 
developing programs to further their suppliers’ knowledge, capabilities, and market 
insights, in combination with effective governance mechanisms for streamlining 
relationships (Schoenherr, et al. 2012). For example, because Toyota is a top customer 
for most of its suppliers, the firm receives far more attention and innovative offerings 
from suppliers than its competitors (Marksberry 2012).  
Yet mounting anecdotal evidence indicates that supply chain partners are not receiving 
the benefits they expected, because suppliers appear reluctant to implement 
improvements (Krause, et al. 2000). Supplier development activities thus do not translate 
into supplier performance improvement (Prahinski & Benton 2004); some firms note that 
their supplier development efforts actually decrease satisfaction (Handfield, et al. 2000), 
perhaps due to misconceptions, misunderstandings, or mistrust in buyer–supplier 
partnerships (McDuffie & Helper 1997). But supplier development represents a relation-
specific investment by the buyer, which is difficult or impossible to redeploy to other 
relationships (Anderson & Weitz 1992), leaving the buyer open to opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson 1985).  
                                                 
1
 See Laseter (1998). 
To address some of these issues, we turn to social capital theory and specifically its 
insights into relational capital. Firms may seek to invest in and cultivate non-economic 
features of their buyer–supplier exchange if they perceive a risk of partner opportunism 
(Wang, et al. 2013). Relational capital then offers an appropriate theoretical lens, because 
supplier development encapsulates two building blocks of relational capital: shared 
knowledge and shared transaction-specific investments (Krause, et al. 2007). We 
therefore consider supplier development an antecedent of relational capital. Furthermore 
we note emerging evidence that relational capital in turn strengthens the impact of 
relational investments by overcoming free-riding behavior and facilitating knowledge 
sharing to create mutual understanding (Chang & Gotcher 2007; Kohtamaki, et al. 2012). 
Supplier development appears particularly effective in well-established relationships with 
high levels of trust and commitment (Wagner 2011). However, to account for diverging 
returns on supplier development programs, and the complexities and challenges faced by 
both buyers and suppliers, we need more managerial-level insights into the nature of this 
asset. Without understanding the mechanism by which supplier development delivers 
benefits, its returns will be negligible at best and detrimental at worst, perhaps even 
leading to the premature abandonment of supplier development initiatives. 
Taking a supplier perspective, this article examines whether the relationship between 
supplier development and relationship benefits can be facilitated by relational capital. In 
turn, we seek to make three substantive theoretical contributions. First, prior research 
focuses on benefits such as operational or efficiency measures of buyer performance, 
rather than the creation of mutual value from a resource exchange (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; 
Villena, et al. 2011). We examine instead the extent to which supplier development 
provides benefits to both the supplier and the buyer. Supplier benefits refer to direct 
rewards of doing business with the buyer and measure the value of the relationship from 
the supplier’s point of view. Buyer benefits entail the preferential treatment a supplier 
gives to a specific buyer in exchange for its past actions or future loyalty. Granting 
preferential buyer benefits is a key weapon in the arsenal of relationship marketing 
activity (Palmatier, et al. 2007b). In addition, we conceptually delineate capability 
development and supplier governance as two dimensions of supplier development and 
assess whether they independently translate into benefits for suppliers or buyers.  
Second, we explicate how supplier development leads to enhanced performance, by 
examining the mediating role of relational capital. We empirically test the proposition 
that relational capital represents a supply chain asset, in which additional resources can 
be invested with the expectation of reciprocation, in the form of mutual benefits for 
buyers and suppliers. Researchers acknowledge the importance of relational capital for 
supply chains (Kohtamaki, et al. 2012) but offer few insights into how organizations 
might build this form of capital. It is suggested that relational capital can derive from 
relational investments, such as those inherent to supplier development activities, which 
should benefit both partners (Villena, et al. 2011).  
Third, whereas previous research regarded relational capital as a mediating construct, no 
research considers its moderating role, specifically from the supplier side (Kohtamaki, et 
al. 2012). We explore whether relational capital might account for heterogeneity in the 
relationship between supplier development and performance and thereby respond to a 
recent call to examine the moderating effects of contingent variables on the activities–
outcome relationships (Mahapatra, et al. 2012). In this sense, we combine the 
transactional approach of supplier development investment with the reciprocal approach 
of relational capital building (Mahapatra, et al. 2012). 
We next define and review literature on supplier development to develop our conceptual 
framework, which includes multiple dimensions of supplier development, relational 
capital, and relationship returns. To assess these intricate relationships empirically, we 
collected survey data from 185 suppliers of a large manufacturing firm. Although 
focusing on suppliers’ perceptions of the benefits of supplier development is a rare 
approach (Ghijsen, et al. 2010), we consider the supplier an appropriate unit of analysis, 
because supplier development effectiveness depends on the suppliers’ own commitment. 
We conclude with a discussion of our findings, which offer both theoretical and 
managerial implications.  
2. Supplier Development  
Supplier development is any activity or resource investment initiated by a buying 
organization to improve the performance of its supplier (Krause, et al. 1998). The 
cooperative effort between a buying firm and its suppliers aims to upgrade suppliers’ 
technical, quality, delivery, and cost management capabilities and foster ongoing 
improvements (Handfield, et al. 2000; Krause 1999). Substantial research explores such 
supplier development activities from the buyer’s perspective, without considering 
suppliers’ perceptions of their benefits. The limited research that takes the supplier’s 
perspective also offers mixed results. Prahinski and Benton (2004) find that supplier 
development activities do not translate directly into supplier performance improvement, 
and Ghijsen et al. (2010) note that activities geared toward capability development 
enhance suppliers’ commitment to the relationship, whereas those centered on 
influencing suppliers’ behavior drive satisfaction with the benefits accrued from the 
relationship. 
It is important to delineate the different aspects of supplier development activities, 
because their impact on relationships is not universal (Ghijsen, et al. 2010; Payan & 
McFarland 2005). The activities aimed at developing suppliers’ capabilities differ 
conceptually from those aimed at influencing the supplier’s behavior by governing 
certain relationship aspects (Krause, et al. 2007; Wagner 2006).  
Capability development refers to the buying firm’s investments and efforts to increase a 
supplier’s capabilities, so that it can meet the buyer’s short- or long-term needs. The 
buying firm may help the supplier by investing in human and capital resources (Krause, 
et al. 1998; Mahapatra, et al. 2012). Capability development investments might include 
(onsite) training to suppliers, offering technical and quality expertise and advice, site 
visits or personnel exchanges between the supplier’s and the buyer’s facilities, 
involvement in the buyer’s new product design and development, and information 
sharing (Krause 1999; Krause, et al. 1998). Because capability development aims to 
enhance the efficiency of supplier operations, it has a direct effect on performance-related 
benefits, such as reduced costs, greater quality and flexibility, more reliable delivery, and 
faster product development cycle times (Krause, et al. 2007). Carr and Kaynak (2007) 
also find that supplier investments likely increase provided product quality, which should 
result in better sales for the supplier. In this sense, capability development is a relational 
investment that can improve the buyer–seller relationship (Li, et al. 2012).  
Supplier governance instead implies that the buying firm invests limited resources to 
encourage or reinforce the supplier’s improvement. Governance requires the systematic 
collection of information by the buyer, so that it can establish the extent of the supplier’s 
compliance with its process or performance requirements. The main steps in supplier 
governance thus are setting supplier performance improvement goals, evaluating 
suppliers, providing performance feedback, offering rewards and recognition for 
improved performance, and establishing supplier certification programs (Krause, et al. 
2007; Modi & Mabert 2007). This process encourages important information exchanges 
that ultimately should help buyers and suppliers improve their own performance (Krause, 
et al. 2007).  
Investments in supplier development by the buyer also are specific to each relationship 
(Anderson & Weitz 1992). Relationship-specific investments include training and/or 
dedicating personnel to service a specific partner, adopting a common order processing 
system, building specialized facilities, and linking the supplier and buyer in the 
customer’s mind through promotions. Such idiosyncratic investments are difficult or 
impossible to redeploy, and they add unique texture to the focal relationship (Anderson & 
Weitz 1992). The expected returns from these investments cannot accrue though unless 
suppliers are willing to commit substantial financial, capital, and personnel resources and 
share timely and sensitive information (Handfield, et al. 2000; Krause et al. 2007). The 
nature of the buyer–seller relationship therefore should have significant impacts on the 
effectiveness of supplier development.  
3. Relational Capital  
Social capital and its specific form relational capital refer to the sum of actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from networks of 
relationships between organizations (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). This theory contends 
that the information, influence, and solidarity inherent in relationships across an 
interorganizational network create value (Adler & Kwon 2002). The effects of social 
capital on relationship performance are transmitted by relational capital (Carey, et al. 
2011; Kohtamaki, et al. 2012; Tsai & Ghoshal 1998), which is defined as the strength of 
the ties between organizations (Granovetter 1992) and provides a profound sense of the 
partner’s reliability and faithfulness in resource exchanges (Moran 2005). Relational 
capital is built by repeated exchanges between partners. Such repeated exchanges are 
characteristic of supplier development activities (Lawson, et al. 2008; Villena, et al. 
2011).  
From a relational capital view, a relationship consists of multiple facets (Bolino, et al. 
2002; Palmatier 2008). Relational capital is reflected by attributes such as trust (Carey, et 
al. 2011), reciprocity (Mathwick, et al. 2008), and affective commitment (Wasko & Faraj 
2005). Trust is not only a basic ingredient of relational capital but also a facilitator of 
collective action (Coleman 1990). In general, it develops when a history of favorable past 
interactions leads to expectations about positive future interactions (Wasko & Faraj 
2005). Reciprocity, or the social norm dictating that an action performed by one party 
requires a compensating movement by the other, is a cornerstone of cooperative exchange 
relationships (Hoppner & Griffith 2011). The feeling of indebtedness that buyers and 
suppliers in a relationship experience provides a sense of obligation to do business in the 
future (Hoppner & Griffith 2011; Kaufman, et al. 2006). Finally, affective commitment is 
suppliers’ predisposition to remain in the relationship because of their positive affect, 
feeling of unity or obligation, and emotional attachment to the buyer (Palmatier, et al. 
2007a). Tuliet al. (2010) suggest that firms embedded with relational capital likely focus 
on their mutual interests over the long run and exhibit greater commitment and 
reciprocity.  
Furthermore, relational capital can help overcome concerns about the relationship-
specific nature of supplier development investments. First, supplier development 
programs are effective mainly when both partners believe in the relative value of this 
resource, yet these beliefs are subject to considerable heterogeneity, which might cause 
tensions in the relationship (Venkataraman 1997). Relational capital encourages a shared 
understanding that can decrease this heterogeneity and create shared appreciation of the 
value of supplier development; it also generates bonding and group solidarity to help 
overcome free-riding (Takahashi 2000; Wang, et al. 2013).  
Second, relational capital increases the effectiveness of supplier development investments 
because it improves the buyer’s technical performance (Lawson, et al. 2008), due to 
suppliers’ increased willingness to participate in joint problem solving and offer 
reciprocal investments. However, their willingness also depends on their perceptions of 
relational capital with the buyer. When relational capital exists, suppliers likely 
reciprocate investments made by buyers, which is a necessary condition for effective 
supplier development. When buyers and suppliers trust each other, they are more willing 
to cooperate and less worried about abuse by their partners (Granovetter 1992; Wang, et 
al. 2013), which in turn facilitates the knowledge sharing and cooperative behavior that is 
needed to make supplier development work (Adler & Kwon 2002; Kohtamaki, et al. 
2012).  
4. Conceptual Model 
Our conceptual model appears in Figure 1, linking two aspects of supplier development 
(capability development, supplier governance) and two dimensions of relationship 
benefits (supplier benefits, buyer benefits) through relational capital. Previous research 
has studied either relationship benefits or performance outcomes, from either the buyers’ 
or (infrequently) the supplier’s point of view. We incorporate both these aspects. As we 
noted previously, supplier benefits are the direct rewards of doing business with the buyer 
(e.g., contract renewal; Handfield, et al. 2000), and buyer benefits are preferential 
treatment granted to a specific buyer in exchange for past or future loyalty (e.g., value-
adding services, customized procedures; Palmatier, et al. 2007b). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In addition to a direct relationship between supplier development and relationship 
benefits, we explore how relational capital mediates and moderates this relationship. 
Supplier development represents relationship-specific investments that leave the buyer 
open to opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985). For example, expropriation effects 
(Wang, et al. 2013) arise when suppliers appropriate all the benefits of the supplier 
development investments for themselves. Suppliers may believe they can avoid 
reciprocating these benefits because the buyer has made so many unique investments in 
the relationship that it cannot leave the relationship (Jap & Ganesan 2000; Williamson 
1985). Relational capital instead prompts group solidarity, generalized reciprocity, 
knowledge sharing, and cooperative behaviors.  
4.1. Supplier Development and Relationship Benefits 
Capability development aims to enhance the efficiency of supplier operations through the 
achievement of performance-related benefits, such as reduced cost, greater quality and 
flexibility, more reliable delivery, and shorter product development cycle times (Krause, 
et al. 2007). These direct benefits for the supplier should increase its effectiveness. In 
addition, Carr and Kaynak (2007) find that the supplier’s responses to supplier 
development programs tend to increase the buyer’s product quality, which results in 
increased sales overall in the channel. Capability development cannot be redeployed and 
thus makes the relationship more important to the buyer too (Humphreys, et al. 2004), 
increasing its desire to maintain and even expand the relationship. Finally, close 
collaborative relationships resulting from capability development initiatives likely allow 
the buyer to develop a position as a customer of choice (Li, et al. 2012). Therefore, 
preferential treatment likely results from capability development, and we hypothesize:  
H1: Capability development is positively associated with (a) supplier benefits 
and (b) buyer benefits. 
Supplier evaluations, feedback, and certification processes also likely provide the buyer 
and supplier with important information to help each partner improve its performance 
(Krause, et al. 2007). Complying with a buyer’s governance requirements is a 
relationship-specific investment by the supplier that increases the supplier’s desire to 
maintain the relationship (Palmatier, et al. 2007a) and its tendency to treat the buyer 
favorably. The process of supplier governance also might increase the level of 
understanding between suppliers and buyers, such that suppliers can better respond to 
buyers’ specific needs and requests, improving their relationship performance (Rogers, 
Purdy, et al. 2007). We posit: 
H2: Supplier governance is positively associated with (a) supplier benefits and 
(b) buyer benefits. 
4.2. Supplier Development and Relational Capital 
Relational capital builds through relational investments (Villena, et al. 2011), such as 
capability development (Li, et al. 2012). The resulting buyer–supplier collaborations 
enhance the supplier’s understanding of the nature of relationship and thus levels of trust, 
commitment, and reciprocity (Anderson & Weitz 1992). Capability development likely 
causes suppliers to view buyers as possessing high degrees of integrity, such that trust is 
likely to develop (Palmatier, et al. 2007a).  
Capability development activities, such as providing training or technology-related 
advice, often involve interactions among buyer and supplier employees who represent 
various functions (e.g., purchasing, production, engineering, quality, logistics). The rich 
communication that takes place in these interactions helps create mutual understanding 
and a shared vision thus enhancing relational capital (McFarland, et al. 2008). Capability 
development requires the exchange of explicit information, often facilitated by 
investments in structural linkages (e.g., formal teams, collaborative information and 
communication technology systems). Such investments enable relationship learning and 
interfirm knowledge sharing (Chang & Gotcher 2007). Similarly, capability 
developments aimed at improving manufacturing processes require direct participation by 
buyers and suppliers, which deepens their relationship. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: Capability development is positively associated with relational capital. 
Governance and evaluation policies seek to increase supplier compliance with buyer 
needs and requests (Rogers, et al. 2007). Supplier governance intensifies the need for 
relational capital, because of the requirement for complex coordination and firm 
participation. Such activities can take place only when the supplier and buyer operate 
from the same foundations (Heide & John 1990), which encourages the supplier to 
develop a closer relationship with the buyer and its representatives. When the process of 
supplier governance involves regular visits to supplier sites aimed at assessing and 
familiarizing itself with the supplier’s operations, it results in more personal, face-to-face 
interactions and increases exchanges of tacit knowledge, which deepens their relational 
capital (Krause, et al. 2007). Supplier governance also sets standards and routine 
procedures for a supplier to follow, creating less confusion, eliminating double standards, 
and reducing divergent interpretations of similar activities but increasing mutual 
understanding and trust (Prahinski & Benton 2004; Storey & Kocabasoglu-Hillmer 
2013). Finally, supplier governance often requires the supplier to adapt its 
communication with the buyer. For example, the supplier might need to adopt the buyer’s 
electronic data interchange system or web portals. This substantive investment of capital 
and effort is specific to the supplier–buyer relationship and leads to further commitment 
to the buyer. We therefore hypothesize:  
H4: Supplier governance is positively associated with relational capital. 
4.3. Relational Capital and Relationship Benefits  
The success of a firm likely depends on its ability to develop relational capital that it can 
use to improve relationship performance (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). Relational capital 
helps activate and translate shared cognitions between the buyer and supplier into value-
enhancing mechanisms (Carey, et al. 2011). Although supplier development programs 
can be an effective resource, they require both partners to embrace their relative value. 
Relational capital reflects a shared understanding reducing the heterogeneity in beliefs 
about the value of supplier development (Venkataraman 1997). In addition, relational 
capital makes it easier to obtain information and increases the confidence of both parties 
in the information exchanged, which decreases the related transaction costs (Dyer & 
Singh 1998). Information about a buyer’s operating environment can help a supplier 
understand its idiosyncratic requirements and demand patterns. In turn, suppliers can 
better tailor offerings to meet those unique needs (Rogers, et al. 2007). Tuli et al. (2010) 
also argue that relational capital helps the supplier gain access to confidential information 
about the buyer, so that it can serve the buyer better.  
In terms of the potential for opportunistic behavior inherent to relationship-specific 
investments (Anderson & Weitz 1992; Williamson 1985), the trust and reciprocity 
embodied in relational capital can help build confidence that both parties will act in good 
faith in negotiations related to the achievement and sharing of benefits (Carey, et al. 
2011). Wang et al. (2013) consider trust a potent mechanism for managing opportunism, 
because it increases social costs and thus discourages the temptation to engage in 
opportunistic behaviors. In addition, relational capital generates bonding and shared 
values (Takahashi 2000), such that suppliers should be more likely to cooperate with 
buyers, enjoy working together, and perceive the possibility of achieving congruent goals 
(Heide & John 1990; Wang, et al. 2013).  
According to reciprocal action theory, actions by relationship partners get reciprocated in 
kind by the other party (Lee, et al. 2008). Therefore, suppliers may deliver preferential 
benefits to buyers on the basis of the relational capital they have built, or in anticipation 
of future benefits. Studies of strategic alliances acknowledge that the development of 
mutual trust encourages special favors (Nooteboom, et al. 1997). Therefore, buyer–
supplier relationships embedded with relational capital, through the confidence and 
assurance they create, are more likely to deliver mutually rewarding benefits. We 
hypothesize: 
H5: Relational capital is positively associated with (a) supplier and (b) buyer 
benefits. 
4.4. Moderating Role of Relational Capital 
As well as acting as a mediator, we argue that relational capital can increase the 
effectiveness of supplier development investments. Reciprocity dictates that an action 
performed by one party requires a compensating act by the other, which is a cornerstone 
of cooperative exchange relationships (Hoppner & Griffith 2011). According to 
reciprocal action theory, actions get reciprocated by partners (Lee, et al. 2008). Effective 
capability development similarly requires mutually supporting actions, which are 
undertaken more freely on behalf of exchange partners when reciprocal benefits are 
expected (Yli-Renko, et al. 2001). Investments by both parties are specific to the 
relationship, so effective mechanisms must be in place to discourage free-riding (Dyer & 
Singh 1998); relational capital embodies reciprocity that can do so (Mahapatra, et al. 
2012; Takahashi 2000). Thus relational capital lowers investment risks and encourages 
reciprocation of investments made by buyers, which is a necessary condition for effective 
supplier development investments.  
Effective supplier development also demands the exchange of confidential information, 
which creates opportunism and leakage risks (Liker & Choi 2004). When buyers and 
suppliers trust each other, they grow more willing to cooperate and are less worried about 
being abused by their partners (Granovetter 1992; Wang, et al. 2013), which facilitates 
knowledge sharing and cooperative behavior (Adler & Kwon 2002; Kohtamaki, et al. 
2012). Much of the knowledge required for capability development is tacit, complex, and 
difficult to convey without relational capital in place. Relational capital enables the joint 
creation of tacit resources that are difficult to share outside the relationship and help 
redress any buyer–supplier power asymmetries, yielding optimized resource deployment 
(Kohtamaki, et al. 2012; Mahapatra, et al. 2012). Chang and Gotcher (2007) indicate that 
relational capital helps increase the learning and operational performance that occurs as a 
result of relationship-specific investments, such as those inherent to capability 
development. With efforts to enhance the supplier’s capabilities, knowledge transfer 
increases along with the degree of human interaction (Wagner & Krause 2009). Thus, 
H6: Relational capital strengthens the relationship (a) between capability 
development and supplier benefits and (b) between capability development 
and buyer benefits. 
Without the moderating effect of relational capital, supplier governance structures merely 
create transaction costs and cause frustration for both sides of the relationship (Adler & 
Kwon 2002; Kohtamaki, et al. 2012). Supplier governance can uncover discrepancies 
between the partners in a way that aggravates asymmetries in perceptions and 
information, causing resentment and reducing coordination (Gilliland, et al. 2010). Wang 
et al. (2013) suggest that relational capital and the shared understanding on which it is 
built should ease the difficulty of determining which factors to evaluate and reduce 
ambiguity in these evaluations. It will be less difficult for buyers to monitor and assess 
their supplier’s performance when they share similar goals and values. Furthermore, 
supplier governance is a formal control mechanism, whereas relational capital offers a 
social control mechanism, which aligns with the complementary nature of formal and 
relational methods of governance in driving relationship performance (Jap & Ganesan 
2000; Liu, et al. 2009). We therefore argue that the presence of relational capital can 
moderate the relationship between governance and benefits by lowering the cost of 
compliance and increasing the effectiveness of monitoring and coordinating efforts.  
Alternatively, supplier governance can have negative implications (Gundlach & Cannon 
2010). Suppliers may become suspicious of their buyer’s motives; research also shows 
that heavy-handed, formalized, rule-specific controls often discourage voluntary 
cooperation (Gilliland, et al. 2010). Relational capital should provide a reservoir of 
goodwill to overcome this suspicion and mitigate the possible harmful effects of supplier 
governance on relationship performance. If trust-based relational capital is low though, 
misunderstandings are more likely, and defenses tend to be high (Robert, et al. 2008), 
such that the knowledge integration required for supplier governance to work is unlikely. 
We predict: 
H7: Relational capital strengthens the relationship (a) between supplier 
governance and supplier benefits and (b) between supplier governance and 
buyer benefits. 
5. Methodology 
5.1. Measurement Instruments 
The measurement instruments included in the survey for this study were established 
scales from previous studies or adapted from extant literature. We pretested and validated 
the questionnaire with semi-structured interviews with five representatives from the 
buying firm and eight supplier representatives. All items were measured on seven-point 
Likert scales (see the Appendix).  
We addressed two aspects of supplier development. Capability development, the direct 
investments in the supplier’s knowledge and processes, was measured by six items 
pertaining to advice given by the buyer (related to technology, quality, or product 
development), training, and collaborations to improve processes (Ghijsen, et al. 2010; 
Wagner & Krause 2009). This indicator reflects the perceived degree of attention directed 
toward the supplier by the buying organization, relative to other organizations. We 
operationalized supplier governance with five items related to monitoring and control 
mechanisms. The items covered formal evaluation procedures, setting clear improvement 
targets, recognition for performance improvements, and the use of supplier certification 
(Krause, et al. 2007; Modi & Mabert 2007). 
Relational capital represented a second-order, reflective, multidimensional latent 
construct with three first-order constructs: trust, reciprocity, and affective commitment. 
This approach is consistent with previous research (Palmatier 2008). These three factors, 
or their combinations, are common to most definitions of relational capital (Nahapiet & 
Ghosal 1998; Wasko & Faraj 2005). Each first-order factor, though related, captures 
unique aspects of the relationship; in aggregate, they reflect how the supplier views the 
relationship. Affective commitment is the predisposition of the supplier to stay in the 
relationship (Kumar, et al. 1994). Reciprocity represents the feeling of indebtedness and 
obligation to do business in the future that the relationship parties experience (Hoppner & 
Griffith 2011; Palmatier 2008). Trust is the extent to which partners expect each other not 
to act selfishly but to follow through on promises (Kaufman, et al. 2006).  
We measured two relationship performance dimensions by capturing benefits to the 
supplier and the buyer. Supplier benefits was measured by  three items covering profit, 
market position, and customer acquisition (Geyskens & Steenkamp 2000), to reflect the 
direct benefits of doing business with the buyer. Buyer benefits measured the extent to 
which the supplier granted preferential treatment to the buyer, in the form of value-added 
services, direct investments, process adaptations, or special treatment (Palmatier, et al. 
2007b). Suppliers evaluated the extent to which they granted preferential buyer benefits 
to the buying firm, compared with the wider population of buyers. 
Finally, we included several control variables. Granting benefits depends on the law of 
voluntarism (Das & Teng 2002), so we measured relative power and dependence in the 
relationship. For the supplier’s dependence, we used the scale developed by Kumar et al. 
(1994); the buyer’s power relied on a three-item latent variable from Mohr et al.  (1996). 
We collected objective information about the buyer’s share of business (i.e., share of the 
buyer in the total turnover of the supplier), on a five-point scale (1 = 1–20%, …, 5 = 81–
100%). We also included a firm size variable, measured as turnover, because small firms 
may be more likely to require supplier support to stay in business (Wagner 2006). To 
control for cultural differences a dummy variable was included for non-European 
suppliers. Furthermore the location of the buying factory was accounted for (dummy 
variables for the two largest factories in Belgium and Italy). Finally, we measured the 
length, in years, of the supplier’s relationship with the buying firm and the length of the 
accounts manager’s working relationship with the buyer (Jap & Ganesan 2000). 
5.2. Sample and Data Collection  
The buying firm selected for this study is a division of a global manufacturer of industrial 
equipment with operations in Belgium, France, and Italy and total annual turnover of 
approximately €3 billion. We surveyed its suppliers and thus excluded contextual effects 
and allowed for a single frame of reference. This buying firm also had a sophisticated 
purchasing and supply management function in place, had rationalized its supply base, 
and invested in supplier development programs. 
The sample included only product-related suppliers for parts needed to assemble the 
buying firm’s end product (e.g., mechanical and electrical parts, cooling systems, 
engines, tires, cables, plating). Excluding small volume and incidental suppliers, we 
identified 254 product-related suppliers, and we received 185 completed surveys from 
these suppliers’ key account managers, for a response rate of 73%. About 65% of the key 
suppliers were based in Belgium and Italy (close to the operations of the buying firm); the 
others were mainly in France, Germany, or the rest of Europe, as we show in Table 1. To 
evaluate non-response bias, we compared early respondents (first tercile) with the late 
respondents (last tercile) and found no significant differences in our study variables 
(Armstrong & Overton 1977). An analysis of variance showed no systematic differences 
in the latent variables between locations. 
[Table 1 about here] 
5.3. Analysis  
We used SmartPLS v2.0 (Ringle, et al. 2005) to obtain partial least squares (PLS) 
estimates for both the measurement and the structural model. Not only was PLS path 
modeling more suitable for this complex model (Chin 1998), but Chin et al. (2003) also 
indicate that PLS path modeling is superior to regression analysis and covariance-based 
methods for testing moderating hypotheses. Relational capital served as the second-order 
construct in the PLS path model, with reflective relationships at the first-order and 
second-order levels, using the repeated indicator approach (Wetzels, et al. 2009). We 
report the first-order and second-order loadings in the Appendix. To test the stability and 
statistical significance of the parameter estimates in the structural model, we used a 
bootstrapping procedure with 500 resamples to generate standard errors (Chin 1998). 
Furthermore, we examined the measurement model to assess its suitability for use in the 
PLS structural model. As we show in the Appendix, the reliability of the latent variables, 
according to composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE), was 
acceptable (Chin 1998; Hair, et al. 2007). The second-order loadings indicated the 
psychometric properties for the constructs (Wetzels, et al. 2009). To assess discriminant 
validity, we compared whether the constructs shared more variance with their own 
measures than with other constructs in the model (Hair, et al. 2007). The value of the 
square root of the AVE for each construct exceeded the bivariate intercorrelations with all 
other remaining constructs in the study (Table 1), and no item had a higher cross-loading 
on another construct than on its intended construct. 
From an exploratory factor analysis of all manifest variables, Harman’s single-factor test 
showed that the first factor accounted for only 28% of the total variance indicating 
common method bias (CMB) was not a significant problem (Podsakoff, et al. 2003). 
Moreover, we applied the Schmid-Leiman solution (Yung, et al. 1999) using principal 
axis factoring, which allowed for the inclusion of a common method factor (Podsakoff, et 
al. 2003). The common method factor accounted for 38% of the total variance. In 
addition. following Liang, et al.’s (2007) approach the structural model estimates with 
and without a latent method factor remained virtually unchanged showing any CMB did 
not materially affect the results (see Table 2). Accordingly, we conclude that CMB does 
not appear to be a significant problem. 
[Table 2 about here] 
6. Findings 
6.1. Direct Effects Model  
Because the psychometric properties of the measurement scales indicated their reliability 
and validity, we used the PLS model to test the hypotheses; we provide the results in 
Table 3. The R-square values of the endogenous variables (Tenenhaus, et al. 2005) 
showed acceptable quality, and a goodness-of-fit (GoF) measure 
(√average R2 ∗ average AVE) reached .48 for the direct effects model. Assuming a large 
average effect size (R2 = .26) and a cut-off value of .50 for the AVE, we calculated a 
comparison GoF value of .36, which supported our model (Tenenhaus, et al. 2005; 
Wetzels, et al. 2009). In addition, the Stone-Geisser Q2, calculated for the outcome 
variables (.30 for supplier benefits and .14 for buyer benefits) suggest its predictive 
relevance (Tenenhaus, et al. 2005). Finally, the variance inflation factors of the latent 
variables in the structural model were less than 2.5, so multicollinearity was not an issue 
(Hair, et al. 2007). 
[Table 3 about here] 
The results indicated conflicting direct effects of supplier development on relationship 
benefits, which failed to support H1 or H2. Capability development had a significant 
positive direct effect on supplier benefits (β = .20, t = 2.42, p < .01), but supplier 
governance’s impact was negative (β = –.15, t = 1.76, p < .05). We found no significant 
direct relationships for both aspects of supplier development and buyer benefits. 
Contrasting this capability development (β = .27, t = 2.96, p < .01) and supplier 
governance (β = .30, t = 2.98, p < .01) had strong significant relationships with relational 
capital. Relational capital was linked to both supplier benefits (H5a: β = .55, t = 8.37, p < 
.01) and buyer benefits (H5b: β = .15, t = 1.80, p < .05).  
6.2. Interaction Effects 
To develop interaction terms, we used a residual product indicator approach (Henseler & 
Chin 2010). Adding the interaction terms to the direct effects model (see Table 2) 
increased the R-square for supplier benefits significantly, from .48 to .53 (∆F = 8.97; p < 
.00). The increase in R-square for buyer benefits was similarly significant (∆R2 = .09; ∆F 
= 11.78; p < .00). Cohen’s f2 were .10 and .14, respectively, suggesting medium effects 
(Henseler & Chin 2010). These results supported the use of a moderated model. 
Relational capital positively moderated the link between capability development and 
supplier benefits (β = .14, t = 2.02, p < .05) but negatively moderated the link with buyer 
benefits (β = –.21, t = 2.36, p < .01). Relational capital had a positive moderating effect 
for the connection of supplier governance with both supplier benefits (β = .12, t = 1.75, p 
< .05) and buyer benefits (β = .16, t = 2.06, p < .05). These results provided support for 
H6a, H7a, and H7b but not H6b. Next, to investigate the interaction effects in detail, we 
split the sample according to high or low levels of the moderating variable, relational 
capital: 1 above or below the mean. Graphs were produced showing the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variables at the these levels. The results are in 
Figure 2. 
[Figure 2. About here] 
7. Discussion 
By examining whether the relationship between supplier development and relationship 
benefits is facilitated by the generation of relational capital, we make three main 
contributions (as outlined in the introduction). First, we help delineate the dimensions of 
supplier development to show that capability development and supplier governance work 
independently. This study is the first to disentangle their impacts on a set of performance 
mechanisms that include both the buyer and the supplier, such that we reduce an existing 
research gap and reveal how supplier development investments get reciprocated. Prior 
research has focused on the benefits of relational capital for operational or efficiency 
measures of buyer performance (Krause, et al. 2007; Lawson, et al. 2008), rather than the 
creation of mutual value through resource exchanges (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; Villena, et 
al. 2011). We find contrasting effects for the two dimensions of supplier development on 
relationship benefits. 
Specifically, the anticipated outcomes for buyers investing in a supplier include potential 
customer-of-choice status, in which case it receives preferential benefits (e.g., value-
added service, operational investments, tailoring responses to specific buyer requests). 
But our results do not support this prediction. Supplier development can lead to 
operational improvements, but the suppliers might not be motivated to reciprocate these 
investments directly by creating differential value and competitive advantages for the 
buyer. By making relationship-specific investments, buyers leave themselves open to 
expropriation effects, such that suppliers act opportunistically and think they can get 
away with not reciprocating (Wang, et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, whereas capability development, as expected, had a direct impact on 
supplier benefits, supplier governance was detrimental to supplier benefits. The 
governance process can uncover discrepancies between the partners and aggravate their 
asymmetries, causing resentment and hindering coordination (Gilliland, et al. 2010). In 
addition formal monitoring tools can be viewed as coercive governance, which does not 
necessarily lead to supplier compliance (Payan & McFarland 2005). The lack of 
coordination and compliance by the supplier means a buyer will be less likely to reward it 
with increased business. This finding helps explain why recent research has shown that 
the use of influence strategies can lead to supplier dissatisfaction (Ghijsen, et al. 2010). 
Second, we clarify how supplier development leads to performance by examining the 
mediating role of relational capital. Relational capital is a bridge between supplier 
development and buyer benefits. Prior researchers indicate the role of relational capital in 
the effective functioning of supply chains but pay relatively less attention to how 
organizations might build relational capital (Carey, et al. 2011; Kohtamaki, et al. 2012). 
Our study fills this gap in supply chain literature by offering, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first evidence that buyers’ investments in supplier development programs 
build relational capital, resulting in mutual benefits.  
Third, in explicating how relational capital can explain heterogeneity in the relationship 
between supplier development and performance, this study responds to a recent call for 
buyer–supplier literature to examine the moderating effects of contingent variables on the 
activities–outcome relationships (Mahapatra, et al. 2012). Insufficient research describes 
relational capital’s moderating role, especially from the supplier side (Kohtamaki, et al. 
2012). Our results show that despite the importance of relational capital, it is not a 
panacea—consistent with recent research that relational capital may not be universally 
beneficial (Wang, et al. 2013).  
Without relational capital though, the supplier’s benefits from capability development 
cannot accrue, and supplier governance will have detrimental effects. In this sense, our 
research supports the view that relational capital increases tacit knowledge sharing and 
enhances learning (Chang & Gotcher 2007), thus optimizing investments on both sides of 
the relationship. Similarly, Payan and McFarland (2005) find that compliance with a 
manufacturer’s recommendations required the distributor first to trust the manufacturer’s 
information. Buyer benefits result from supplier governance only if relational capital 
exists. The development of relational capital also decreases the fear of opportunistic 
behavior and thus encourages shared benefits (Carey, et al. 2011; Nooteboom, et al. 
1997). 
As an unexpected result, we found that capability development, in conditions with high 
relational capital, leads to lower buyer benefits, which we might explain by noting the 
subtle dichotomy between gratitude and indebtedness. If the supplier feels indebted to the 
buyer, following from its capability development investments, it also may feel less 
gratitude (Watkins, et al. 2006). Recent research has shown that this effect increases in 
circumstances marked by social self-consciousness and anxiety (Mathews & Green 
2010). Relational capital may create anxiety, in terms of not wanting to feel indebted, and 
reduce gratitude toward the buyer, such that the supplier shows less gratitude in the form 
of preferential buyer treatment. In addition, with low relational capital, the supplier is 
unsure of its standing with the buyer and may feel obliged to repay the buyer for its 
development investments by immediately providing preferential buyer benefits. Similar 
evidence of the detrimental effects of being too close to relationship partners appears in 
some emergent research (Villena, et al. 2011; Wang, et al. 2013). 
8. Managerial Implications 
This study provides several implications for buyers that want to improve their 
competitive positioning. Supplier development may not be sufficient to guarantee 
preferential access to scarce supply resources; to become a customer of choice, buyers 
need to build relational capital. Without this supporting mechanism, the returns on their 
supplier development investments likely are negligible, or even negative.  
Especially in the current economic environment, supplier development needs a critical 
review, because it represents a serious investment of time and resources. In particular, 
buying firms should pursue effective supplier segmentation to ensure that their valuable 
time and resources are being allocated to the right suppliers. Although segmentation 
criteria such as spending volume, business criticality, and supply risk (Kraljic 1983) still 
dominate, we suggest acknowledging the importance of relational capital and use 
alternative supplier segmentation criteria, such as trust, appetite for collaboration, and 
mutual understanding of value creation potential.  
The objectives of supplier development efforts also should include improving operational 
performance, as suggested by prior studies (Krause, et al. 2000), rather than just receiving 
direct preferential benefits. Handfield et al. (2000) suggest that buyers’ motivation for 
developing suppliers often is based on an expectation of direct, real-time, price 
reductions. This motivation may be inappropriate, because suppliers perceive it as a 
coercive action that reduces their relational capital. The recognition that capability 
development and supplier governance, in different relationship conditions, drive distinct 
relationship benefits will allow relationship partners to set appropriate goals and better 
balance investments across different development aspects.  
Relational capital is at least partially affective in nature, so it also is important for buyers 
to think about the impression they want to make on their suppliers. Interpersonal 
interaction is key; the “little” things make a big difference. Toyota encourages its 
employees (from different functional areas and managerial levels) to be humble and 
friendly when dealing with key suppliers (Day 2011). Rather than assigning relations to a 
single purchasing manager, all functional managers interacting with a supplier have 
equally important relationship management roles. Creating affinity groups of buyer and 
supplier employees with similar responsibilities can align opinions, views, feelings, and 
behaviors and help build cohesiveness and trust between organizations (McGrath & 
Sparks 2005). In addition, the continued growth of social media and communication 
technologies will keep speeding up knowledge and information exchanges across social 
networks (Rozemeijer, et al. 2012), with potentially significant impacts for relational 
capital. 
Finally, buyers that do not pay their invoices on time, cannot provide reliable order 
forecasts, fail to live up their promises, or must rely on many rush orders—in other 
words, buyers that are not in control of their own purchasing processes—will never be 
attractive customers to suppliers and thus will have great difficulties building necessary 
levels of relational capital to realize the potential benefits of supplier development 
(Rozemeijer 2008). Supplier satisfaction surveys can reveal the extent to which suppliers 
express satisfaction with actual organizational buying behavior and thus help buyers 
understand how suppliers perceive them, as well as how they compare with other 
customers.  
9. Conclusions  
Investments in supplier development do not automatically result in benefits for the 
supplier or reciprocated benefits for the buyer. Rather, relational capital has important 
mediating and moderating effects on the relationships across different dimensions of 
supplier development and relational benefits. The danger is that without relational capital, 
benefits can fail to materialize or even cause harm. However, capability development and 
supplier governance can effectively increase the relational capital embedded in buyer–
supplier relationships.  
This study provides the first investigation of the interrelationship of supplier development 
and relational capital from the supplier’s point of view. Although it thus fills a research 
gap, it also represents a limitation; further research might take a dyadic perspective. A 
particular area of interest is the extent to which the two sides’ perceptions of social 
capital align, and the effects of any misalignment on relationship performance. Further 
research should consider whether effective supplier development investments require 
matched, relationship-specific investments by buyers and suppliers.  
As a second limitation, our research method created a high risk of CMB. Our analyses 
suggested it was not a significant problem, yet the possibility remains that the results 
suffered from CMB. We hope additional studies collect more objective, rather than 
subjective, performance data.  
This research also adopted a static perspective and thus did not capture causal effects. 
Longitudinal research could overcome this limitation and reveal how relational capital 
and relational benefits coevolve with supplier development investments over time. For 
example, how quickly can relational capital be built, and how quickly can it be 
transformed into supplier and buyer benefits? We call on further research to determine 
whether it is preferable to initiate capability development before putting a supplier 
governance system in place, or vice versa. 
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Appendix: Constructs and component variables 
 Standardized 
loadings (λ) 
Capability Development (CR = .93; AVE = .69)  
We receive training from Buyer X.a 
Buyer X collaborates with us to improve our manufacturing processes. 
Buyer X gives us technological advice (e.g., on materials, software). 
Buyer X gives us product development advice (e.g., on processes, project management). 
Buyer X gives us quality related advice (e.g., on the use of inspection equipment, quality 
assurance procedures). 
Buyer X standardizes product specifications together with us.  
0.72 
0.84 
0.89 
0.91 
0.86 
 
0.77 
Supplier Governance (CR = .88; AVE = .66)  
Buyer X sets clear improvement targets. 
Buyer X uses a formal procedure to evaluate our performance (e.g., audits, quality, delivery 
measurement). 
We are recognized by Buyer X for the improvements we realize. 
We have been certified to work with Buyer X  
Buyer X visits our site to assess our processes.b 
0.89 
0.88 
 
0.86 
0.58 
Relational Capital (CR = .89; AVE = .74)  
Trust (CR = .87; AVE = .69)c 
When making decisions, Buyer X considers our business interest as well as its own. 
We trust that Buyer X keeps our best interest in mind.  
We can count on Buyer X to follow through on their promises.  
Reciprocity (CR = .81; AVE = .52) 
Buyer X feels indebted to our firm as a supplier for what we have done for them.  
We feel indebted to Buyer X for what they have done for us.  
The relationship that we have with Buyer X can be defined as “mutually beneficial.”  
We expect that we will be working with Buyer X far into the future.  
Commitment (CR = .86; AVE = .66) 
It is pleasant working with Buyer X that is why we continue the relationship.  
We want to remain a supplier to Buyer X.  
Our decision to remain a supplier for Buyer X is based on our attraction to the things that 
Buyer X represents as a firm (e.g., image, brand, reference).  
0.87 
0.84 
0.87 
0.77 
0.85 
0.69 
0.73 
0.76 
0.69 
0.85 
0.81 
0.85 
0.78 
Buyer Benefits (CR = .83; AVE = .55)  
Buyer X receives special value-added benefits from us (e.g., inventory control, expediting, 
training). 
Buyer X receives special treatment from us 
We adapt our procedures to Buyer X. 
We have made specific investments for Buyer X. 
0.61 
 
0.77 
0.80 
0.77 
Supplier Benefits (CR = .83; AVE = .63)  
The relationship with Buyer X has provided our firm with a profitable market position. 
Through the relationship with Buyer X we were able to attract other customers. 
Doing business with Buyer X is profitable. 
0.78 
0.71 
0.88 
  
Appendix cont. 
Controls  
Buyer Power (CR = .85; AVE = .74)  
Buyer X can pretty much dictate how well we produce the product.  
Buyer X has a significant influence on our operations. 
Buyer X has changed and/or influenced our programs and/ or procedures and/or policies.b 
0.77 
0.94 
Supplier Dependence (CR = .88; AVE = .72)  
There is too much effort (time and/or energy and/or expense) in switching to another 
customer, that is why we stay with Buyer X. 
Right now staying with Buyer X is a matter of necessity since no feasible alternatives exist.  
It is too difficult to switch to another customer because of the lack of good alternatives, 
therefore we stay with Buyer X; otherwise, we would consider leaving. 
0.88 
 
0.79 
0.88 
Notes: CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
aAll scales were assessed on seven-point Likert scales. 
bItem removed during analysis. 
cFirst-order factors. 
 
  
   
Length of suppliers’ working relationship with buyer: 
< 5 years 
> 5 to ≤ 10 years 
> 10 to ≤ 15 years 
> 15 years 
 
 
25% 
24% 
20% 
31% 
 
Supplier sector (SIC): 
Industrial and commercial materials 
Electronics and other electrical 
Fabricated metal products 
Measurement, analysis and control products 
Primary metal industries 
Other 
 
 
35% 
20% 
17% 
9% 
9% 
10% 
 
Annual turnover ( €m): 
< 50  
> 50 to ≤ 100 
> 100 to ≤ 1,000 
> 1,000 
Average 
 
64% 
13% 
10% 
13% 
€403m 
Supplier country: 
Belgium 
Italy 
Germany 
France 
Other European 
Non-European 
 
 
34% 
32% 
9% 
6% 
13% 
6% 
Length of key account manager’s working relationship with buyer: 
< 5 years 
> 5 to ≤ 10 years 
> 10 to ≤ 15 years 
> 15 years 
 
 
43% 
29% 
15% 
13% 
Gender of respondents:  Male = 88%, Female = 12%. 
 
 
Table 1. Sample Demographics 
 
  Latent variable A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A. Supplier Benefits 0.791            
B. Buyer Benefits 0.13 0.74           
C. Relational Capital 0.63 0.20 0.86          
D. Capability Development 0.40 0.12 0.47 0.83         
E. Supplier Governance 0.33 0.19 0.48 0.65 0.81        
F. Supplier Dependence -0.17 -0.09 -0.21 0.04 -0.12 0.85       
G. Buyer Power 0.31 0.36 0.25 0.37 0.41 -0.01 0.86      
H. Non-European Supplier 0.12 -0.28 0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -     
I. Sales 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.27 -0.01 0.22 -0.09 -    
J. Factory Location(Italy) 0.12 0.09 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 0.17 -0.11 -0.06 -   
K. Factory Location(Belgium) -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.11 0.06 -0.09 0.17 0.14 n.a. -  
L. Size -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.17 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 0.02 -0.14 -0.01 0.04 - 
M. Length of Relationship 0.08 0.26 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.35 0.08 -0.12 0.07 0.10 
1. √ AVE 
 
Table 2. Latent Variable Correlations 
 
 Direct Effects Model  Interaction Effects Model 
Path β t β t Hypothesis 
supported 
Capability Development → Supplier Benefit 0.20** 2.42 0.17* 2.27 H1a: Yes 
Capability Development → Buyer Benefits -0.10 1.30 -0.08 1.33 H1b: No 
Supplier Governance → Supplier Benefits -0.15* 1.76 -0.14* 1.79 H2a: No 
Supplier Governance → Buyer Benefits 0.02 0.31 0.03 0.51 H2b: No 
Capability Development → Relational Capital 0.27** 2.96 0.27** 2.98 H3: Yes 
Supplier Governance → Relational Capital 0.30** 2.98 0.30** 3.12 H4: Yes 
Relational Capital → Supplier Benefits 0.55** 8.37 0.57** 9.52 H5a: Yes 
Relational Capital → Buyer Benefits 0.15* 1.80 0.14* 1.68 H5b: Yes 
Buyer Power → Supplier Benefits 0.11* 1.72 0.13* 2.32  
Buyer Power → Buyer Benefits 0.31** 3.82 0.26** 3.22  
Supplier Dependency → Supplier Benefits -0.08 1.54 -0.05 1.40  
Supplier Dependency → Buyer Benefits -0.08 1.36 -0.07 1.23  
Firm Size → Supplier Benefits -0.05 1.13 -0.06 1.45  
Firm Size → Buyer Benefits -0.11* 1.77 -0.16** 2.87  
Non-European Supplier → Supplier Benefits -0.13* 2.12 0.13* 2.04  
Non-European Supplier → Buyer Benefits -0.18* 1.78 0.12 1.45  
Relationship Length → Supplier Benefits 0.04 0.97 0.04 0.81  
Relationship Length → Buyer Benefits 0.21** 2.88 0.18** 2.56  
Factory Location(Italy) → Supplier Benefits 0.13* 2.08 0.09 1.57  
Factory Location(Italy) → Buyer Benefits 0.09 1.49 0.07 1.22  
Factory Location(Belgium)→ Supplier Benefits 0.05 0.92 0.02 0.48  
Factory Location(Belgium) → Buyer Benefits 0.10 1.49 0.11 1.64  
Capability Development  Relational Capital 
→ Supplier Benefits   0.14* 2.02  H6a: Yes 
Capability Development  Relational Capital 
→ Buyer Benefits   -0.21** 2.36 H6b: No 
Supplier Governance  Relational Capital → 
Supplier Benefits   0.12* 1.75 H7a: Yes 
Supplier Governance  Relational Capital → 
Buyer Benefits   0.16* 2.06 H7b: Yes 
Variance Explained (R2) 
 Relational Capital 
 Supplier Benefits 
 Buyer Benefits 
 
0.27 
0.48 
0.26 
  
- 
0.53 
0.35 
 F change 
 
8.97 ** 
11.78 ** 
* Path significant at p < .05. ** Path significant at p < .01 (one-tailed). 
 
Table 3. Results of PLS Analysis  
 
  
  
Figure 1. Mediating and Moderating Role of Relational Capital on the Supplier 
Development–Relationship Benefits Link  
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Figure 2. Graphs of Interaction Effect 
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